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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
ship upon the defendant, while placing an excessive power in the
hands of the prosecutor. In the instant case the defendant has been
put on trial two times for the same violation, and, as a result of the
denial of his motion for acquittal, will again be placed on trial.
His jeopardy right has not been violated because there has been no
final determination of his case, so until he is either acquitted or
convicted his right will not be vested. The weakness illustrated by
this case is that the defendant has no means of appealing from an
order denying his motion for acquittal. Here the court in refus-
ing to grant his appeal from the lower courts denial of his motion,
held that the denial of the motion was not sufficiently final as to
make it appealable.
An analogous situation exists in West Virginia where our
court has consistently denied writs of error from an order of a
lower court reversing the judgment of an inferior court and re-
manding the same for further proceedings. Rainey v. Freeport Coal
& Coke Co., 58 W. Va. 881, 52 S.E. 473 (1910), State v. Bluefleld
Drug Co., 41 W. Va. 638, 24 S.E. 649 (1896). The same concept
was applied to original proceedings in a circuit court when in State
v. Martin, 67 W. Va. 545, 68 S.E. 270 (1910), the court stated that if
the law in State v. Bluefleld Drug Co., supra, was correct, the same
rule would apply to the judgment of a circuit court which was set
aside.
The case of State v. Bluefield Drug Co., supra, presents an
excellent parallel to the Gilmore case, and serves to point out more
clearly the need for legislative or judicial relief in some form.
The defendant in this case was indicted in 1894 for selling liquor
without a license, and upon trial in the Criminal Court of Mercer
County, received the verdict, but a new trial was granted upon the
states exceptions by the circuit court. On appeal the supreme court
awarded a writ of error, then held that it lacked jurisdiction. The
defendant was tried and convicted and, upon appeal for the second
time, the conviction was reversed and another new trial was or-
dered. In refusing to grant a writ of error after the initial reversal,
the court recognized the need for some limitation upon the grant-
ing of new trials, stating that, "If the law operates harshly, the strict
enforcement of it is the most certain way to secure its speedy
amendment, and while it is more pleasurable to do equal justice
in merciful disregard of the unbending forms of law, yet duty re-
quires a strict adherence to every varying crook and turn."
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CASE COMMENTS
To point out the existing weakness is relatively easy; to pre-
scribe the cure a different matter. Several possibilities, however,
do present themselves.
In England the power to order a new trial is rarely exercised,
the feeling being that to allow a second trial serves no other purpose
than to harass the defendant. Due to the vitality of this policy the
prosecution is brought to the realization that it will have one, and
only one, chance at the defendant. This tends to move it to more
careful and thorough preparation of its case for the initial trial. The
end result being that the long sought after ideal of the "perfect
trial" is brought closer to actual realization. Criminal Appeal Act,
1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23.
A later, and perhaps more practical, means was used by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the case of Commonwealth v.
Turner, 189 Pa. 239, 133 A.2d 187 (1957). In this case upon appeal
from the defendants fifth conviction, and after numerous reversals
for insufficient evidence, the court ordered a reversal and granted
a "conditional new trial." The condition being that the prosecution
must be able to show that it can produce new evidence which would
support another conviction. Although the court in the case acted
due to the extreme situation involved, it does point the way to a
means of judicial prevention of the reoccurrence of such injustices.
The two remedies refered to represent the extremes in correct-
ing the difficulty. The former while eliminating the problem also
eliminates the benefit. While the latter is invoked only after sub-
stantial hardship has already been wrought. There is perhaps a
middle ground which wotld allow retention of the benefits of the
present rule, while relieving some of the hardship which can result
from its unbending application. But whatever the means it is evident
that some method should be made available to the defendant, so
as to protect him from this form or harrassment.
f. G. V. M.
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